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NIO/EUR 11 December 1986

NIE 23-83: "West Germany, Security Issues, and the Alliance" (July 1983)

-- In the period just preceding planned INF deployment, warned the policy community of the possibility of violent domestic confrontation in West Germany; stressed Chancellor Kohl's need to demonstrate that Moscow, not Washington, was the chief obstacle to successful arms negotiations; outlined conditions under which Kohl -- despite his commitment to install INF on schedule -- might be persuaded to support a deployment moratorium.

NIE 12-84: "Pressures for Economic and Political Change in Eastern Europe: Implications for East and West" (12 March 1984)

-- Assessed mounting economic and political pressures that created "hidden contention" between the Soviet Union and its allies -- six months before this contention broke into the open over inter-German relations; outlined chief points of US leverage in relations with Hungary, Romania, and (via Bonn) East Germany.

NIE 12.4/23-85: "The Growth in Intra-German Relations: Implications for East and West" (October 1985)

-- Warned policy community of growing challenge to both alliances of the blossoming "special relationship" between the two Germanies; stressed domestic pressures on the Kohl government to stay a step ahead of the SPD in expanding "Deutschlandpolitik"; noted new opportunities for leverage in US-East German relations. (DIA took exception, arguing that differences between Moscow and East Berlin are marginal.)

NIE 20/11-85: "Major NATO Allies: Perspectives on the Soviet Union" (September 1985)

-- Warned the policy community of a growing pattern of differences between the US and its major allies regarding perceptions of the Soviet threat and the likelihood of widening differences on policy responses. This estimate forecast many of the strains now evident in the relationship.

NIE 12.5-86: "Hungary: The Waning of the Kadar Era" (May 1986)

-- Forecast that the Hungarian experiment in economic reform and relaxed political restraints was undergoing major new strains and that the succession to Kadar could be more disruptive than widely appreciated. (The first estimate on Hungary since 1955.)

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NIE 29.4-86: "Malta: New Openings for US Adversaries" (March 1986)

-- Provided the policymakers a coordinated view -- INR not concurring -- that Libya and the USSR might make gains on Malta and that Libya in particular was seeking a military-security toehold on Malta. The NIE also forewarned that Malta s Liibya tie might entangle it in confrontations with the US over terrorism. (The first estimate on Malta since 1971.)